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INTRODUCTION
Sometimes, strong performance is a dual-edged sword. As a result
of the application of the common carrier doctrine and the modal strengths
of freight transportation via rail, railroads are prohibited from refusing
shipment of dangerous cargo such as nuclear waste, toxic inhalation haz-
ard chemicals (“TIH chemicals”), and other dangerous shipments (with the
exception of nuclear waste, collectively referred to in this note as “hazmat
shipments”1).2 The prohibition against refusing hazmat shipments is
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, William & Mary School of Law.
1 See 49 C.F.R. § 1580.100(b) (2009) (defining “rail security-sensitive materials”).
2 See 49 U.S.C. § 11101 (2006) (setting forth rail carriers’ common carrier obligation to
provide transportation or service on reasonable request as well as to “provide to any person,
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unique to the railroad industry.3 A direct result of the common carrier
obligation is the specter of limitless exposure of railroads to financial lia-
bility in the event of an accident releasing hazmat shipments that the rail-
roads had no choice in deciding whether to transport in the first place.4
The dangers of hazmat releases in any context, including rail transporta-
tion, implicate environmental, public health, and anti-terrorism concerns.5
At bottom, an “unfunded mandate” of sorts surfaces, wherein railroads
are forced to assume what they perceive as an unreasonable financial risk,
while those benefitting from this policy, including hazmat shippers, the
government, and the general public, assume few, if any, of its costs.6 The
focus of this note is on the allocation of damages in the event of a cata-
strophic release of hazmats in a densely populated urban area.
on request, the carrier’s rates and other service terms”); 49 C.F.R. pt. 1300 (2009) (imple-
menting certain provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 11101). See also Chicago & Aurora R.R. Co. v.
Thompson, 19 Ill. 578, 583 (1858) (“We suppose it is not necessary the charter should
provide, in so many words, that the railroad companies created by them shall be common
carriers. The authorities are numerous to the point that such companies  . . . are common
carriers, and liable as such.”). Common carrier obligations have gone so far as to require
a railroad to publish rates for the carriage of nuclear waste. See, e.g., Akron, Canton &
Youngstown R.R. Co. v. ICC, 611 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1979). Despite the applicability of
common carrier doctrine to nuclear waste transportation generally, liability issues arising
from transportation of nuclear waste are dealt with under the Price-Anderson Act. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(n)(1)(B), 2210(n)(1)(E) (2006).
3 See, e.g., ASS’N OF AM. R.R., HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION BY RAIL: AN UNFAIR LIABILITY
1 (2009), available at http://www.aar.org/safety/~/media/aar/backgroundpapers/hazmat
transportationbyrailanunfairliability.ashx [hereinafter UNFAIR LIABILITY] (“Unlike trucks,
barges, and airlines, railroads are required by current law to transport TIH materials—
even if they don’t want to and even though transporting TIH materials presents an
enormous risk.”).
4 See id. In testimony before the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”), a Class I railroad
estimated the costs of a “nightmare scenario” release at $4–5 billion. See Michael F.
McBride, Is the Price-Anderson Act an Appropriate Model for the Railroads?, 76 J. TRANSP.
L. LOGISTICS & POL’Y 93, 100 n.15 (2009).
5 These interrelated considerations are apparent throughout this note, although they are
most relevant in the discussions of chemical dangers and rail safety improvements. See
infra Part II.
6 See UNFAIR LIABILITY, supra note 3, at 1 (“As long as policymakers continue to require
railroads to transport TIH materials, they should address the unfair risk this obligation
forces railroads to assume.”). See also BNSF Ry. Co., Comments to Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, STB Ex Parte No. 681, Class I Railroad Accounting and Financial
Reporting—Transportation of Hazardous Materials, at 1–2 (Feb. 4, 2009) (on file with
author) [hereinafter BNSF Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681] (“The transportation of
hazardous materials . . . due to the possibility of a significant accident where the costs
greatly exceed any commercially available insurance make [sic] BNSF’s shareholders the
ultimate insurer of TIH shipments.”).
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Part I of this note discusses the historical genesis and present
contours of railroads’ designation and regulation as common carriers.
Part II examines the necessity of maximizing hazmat transportation by
freight rail. This discussion takes place in two subparts. Part II.A examines
the applications and dangers of the most common hazmats shipped by rail
in order to provide perspective on the true necessity of these substances,
and their shipment, to everyday life. Included in this section are examples
of two real accidents, demonstrating the human, environmental, and finan-
cial costs of accidental hazmat releases while in transit. Part II.B looks
at the modal advantages of rail transport that make it the best means of
transporting these potentially life-threatening shipments whenever pos-
sible. It includes a discussion of the technological and operational mea-
sures adopted by the rail industry to help prevent or mitigate future
accidents, as well as a discussion of the general environmental benefits
of freight rail.
Against the backdrop of the necessity of hazardous materials to
our everyday lives and the comparative strength of rail as a means of
providing safe transportation of these shipments, Part III examines five
methods of addressing the problem caused by the application of the com-
mon carrier doctrine to hazmats. It is important to note at the outset that
the question of encouraging chemical substitutions—using safer chemicals
whenever possible in order to limit the quantity of dangerous chemicals
being shipped—is a distinct inquiry from that presented here. As the
Committee on Assessing Vulnerabilities Related to the Nation’s Chemical
Infrastructure points out:
The most desirable solution to preventing chemical releases
is to reduce or eliminate the hazard where possible, not to
control it. This can be achieved by modifying processes
where possible to minimize the amount of hazardous mate-
rial used, lower the temperatures and pressures required,
replace a hazardous substance with a less hazardous sub-
stitute, or minimize the complexity of a chemical process.7
Ultimately, use of inherently safer technology would either drastically
limit or render this issue moot altogether.8 The discussion here is limited
7 COMM. ON ASSESSING VULNERABILITIES RELATED TO THE NATION’S CHEM. INFRASTRUCTURE,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TERRORISM AND THE CHEMICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: PROTECTING
PEOPLE AND REDUCING VULNERABILITIES 106 (2006), available at http://www.nap.edu/
catalog/11597.html.
8 See UNFAIR LIABILITY, supra note 3, at 2.
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to the short-term question of reforming the current liability regime.9 The
note examines five alternatives, two of which have been suggested by the
Association of American Railroads (“AAR”).10 Part III.A examines local-
ized regulation of the routing of hazmat shipments. Part III.B discusses
the modification or outright abolition of the common carrier doctrine.
Part III.C examines the possibility of a statutory cap on damages in tort
cases stemming from rail transport of hazmat shipments. Part III.D looks
at reforming the Uniform Railroad Costing System (“URCS”) to better cap-
ture the costs of hazmat transport for Class I railroads.11 Finally, Part III.E
examines the concept of a “liability backstop” similar to the Price-Anderson
Act used in the nuclear energy industry.12 The note concludes by arguing
for the implementation of a liability backstop because of that system’s
unique ability to simultaneously protect the public, ensure compensation
for damages when necessary, encourage railroads to continue to ship the
dangerous chemicals that are a key component to everyday life, and encour-
age chemical producers to develop inherently safer chemicals by including
them in a liability backstop system as well.
9 Norfolk Southern Railway Company describes the perceived misallocation of costs and
benefits of hazmat production, transportation, and use as follows:
[P]roducers and users of highly hazardous materials are producers and
users of their own accord. They are able to make the production or use
of highly hazardous materials an economically rational choice and gen-
erally have the option to cease the production or use of highly hazardous
materials. . . . In contrast, the railroads transport highly hazardous mate-
rials primarily, if not exclusively, because the common carrier obligation
as currently interpreted gives the railroads no choice but to do so.
Norfolk S. Ry. Co., Comments to Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, STB Ex Parte
No. 681, Class I Railroad Accounting and Financial Reporting—Transportation of Hazardous
Materials, at 3 (Feb. 4, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Norfolk S. Ry. Co. Comments
to STB Ex Parte No. 681].
10 UNFAIR LIABILITY, supra note 3, at 2.
11 A “Class I Railroad” is defined as a railroad “having annual carrier operating revenues
of $250 million or more after applying the railroad revenue deflator formula” based on
the Railroad Freight Price Index developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 49 C.F.R.
1201.1-1 (2009).
12 See Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006). The Association of American Railroads
(“AAR”) has suggested the possibility of a statutory cap on damages, as well as the creation
of a liability backstop. UNFAIR LIABILITY, supra note 3, at 2. The STB is currently consid-
ering the possibility of reforming the Uniform Railroad Costing System (“URCS”) to better
reflect hazmat shipment costs. See generally STB Ex Parte No. 681, Class I Railroad
Accounting and Financial Reporting—Transportation of Hazardous Materials, 74 Fed.
Reg. 248 (proposed Jan. 5, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 1201, 1242) [hereinafter
STB Ex Parte No. 681 ANPR].
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I. OVERVIEW OF RAILROADS’ COMMON CARRIER OBLIGATIONS
Originally a common law doctrine, railroads’ obligations as common
carriers were codified by the Interstate Commerce Act.13 Chief among these
obligations is the duty of common carriers to transport all goods offered
for transportation.14 As common carriers, “railroads are held to a higher
standard of responsibility than most private enterprises.”15 As a result,
railroads may not refuse shipment on the basis of inconvenience or lack of
profitability.16 In the context of this discussion, the common carrier doc-
trine requires railroads to transport hazmat shipments, despite any objec-
tions over the allocation of cost and potential liability for damages caused
in the course of these movements.17
The common carrier obligations imposed upon railroads are not
absolute; in response to a disability on the part of the carrier, it may de-
clare an embargo, which, if validly declared, would relieve it of its common
carrier obligations.18 Typically, an embargo is declared as a result of phys-
ical damage such as weather and flood damage, tunnel deterioration, or a
lack of equipment.19 Embargoes are temporary service stoppages, as op-
posed to the permanent or indefinite termination of service brought about
by the abandonment of a rail line.20 The touchstone of embargo validity is
reasonableness,21 and the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) evalu-
ates the reasonableness of embargoes using a five-factor, fact-intensive
balancing test examining: “(1) the cost to repair the railroad; (2) the intent
of the railroad; (3) the length of the embargo; (4) the amount of traffic on
the line and (5) the financial condition of the carrier.”22 If properly enacted,
an embargo forecloses the possibility of damages against a railroad for
failure to fulfill its common carrier obligations.23
13 Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 406 (1967).
14 Id. at 406 (citing New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchs. Bank of Boston, 6 How. 344,
382–383 (1848)).
15 Gen. Foods Corp. v. Baker, 451 F.Supp. 873, 875 (D. Md. 1978).
16 Id. (citing United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
17 See UNFAIR LIABILITY, supra note 3, at 1.
18 GS Roofing Prods. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 262 F.3d 767, 773 (8th Cir. 2001).
19 GS Roofing Prods. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 143 F.3d 387, 392 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Gen. Foods Corp. v. Baker, 451 F.Supp. 873, 876 (D. Md. 1978)).
20 ICC v. Baltimore & Annapolis R.R. Co., 398 F. Supp. 454, 462 (D. Md. 1975) (citing ICC
v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 501 F.2d 908, 911 (8th Cir. 1974)).
21 GS Roofing Prods., 143 F.3d at 392.
22 Decatur Cnty. Comm’rs v. Surface Transp. Bd., 308 F.3d 710, 715 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing
GS Roofing Prods. Co., 143 F.3d at 392).
23 Gen. Foods Corp., 451 F.Supp. at 876.
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The embargo is clearly an inappropriate doctrinal vehicle to address
the problems created by the application of the common carrier doctrine to
hazmat transportation by rail.24 First, in the hypothetical case of a rail-
road refusing to transport highly hazardous shipments, it is doubtful that
such a defense for refusal of carriage could successfully be asserted be-
cause it would fail to satisfy a number of the criteria used by the STB in
evaluating the validity of embargoes.25 Most likely to defeat any possibility
of an embargo in this context are the first two of the STB factors—the “cost
of repair” and “intent of [railroad]” elements.26 A refusal to transport
hazmat shipments has nothing to do with physical impossibility on the
part of the railroad, and the intent of a railroad in this scenario is clear
enough: to avoid the financial risk coming as a result of fulfillment of its
common carrier obligations.
Also, a hypothetical refusal to transport hazmats would arguably
turn a blind eye to economic reality; each year, American freight railroads
transport an average of 1.7 million carloads of hazmat shipments.27 This
figure represents the majority of the 2.04 million carloads of hazardous
and non-hazardous chemicals shipped via rail in 2008.28 In addition to
accounting for 6.7% of Class I railroads’ carloads, shipment of chemicals
accounted for 12.6% of Class I railroads’ revenues in 2008.29 Despite the
financial risks posed by transportation of these dangerous chemicals, the
notion of Class I railroads taking action that would result in foregoing
$7.7 billion in annual revenue is arguably irrational, especially when
noting that in 2007, 99.996% of rail hazmat shipments reached their
destinations incident-free.30
Second, and perhaps more important, use of embargoes in this
context will constitute an immense disservice to the general public, as
these shipments would be forced onto the nation’s highways in greater
24 See Michael McBride, Railroad Transportation of Nuclear Waste and Other Hazardous
Materials, ELEC. J., Apr. 2008, at 55, 57–59 (discussing limitations on embargoes).
25 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
26 See McBride, Railroad Transportation, supra note 24, at 58 (discussing the limitations
on embargoes and providing an example of an embargo declared an unlawful abandonment
after consideration of the relevant factors, including cost of repairs).
27 Hazmat: FAQ, Ass’n of Am. R.R., http://www.aar.org/Safety/Hazmat/Hazmat-FAQ.aspx
(last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
28 See ASS’N OF AM. R.R., RAILROADS AND CHEMICALS 3 (2009), http://www.aar.org/Home/
AAR2/InCongress/~/media/AAR/BackgroundPapers/RailroadsandChemicals.ashx
[hereinafter RAILROADS AND CHEMICALS] (this figure pertains to Class I railroads).
29 Id. at 2.
30 See id. at 3–4.
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numbers, increasing the risk posed to the general public.31 For this reason,
it is also imperative that the common carrier obligation be maintained.
The specific strengths and public benefits of hazmat shipment via rail are
discussed in Part II.B below.
II. THE NECESSITY OF HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION BY RAIL
For a variety of reasons, transportation of hazmat shipments via
freight rail represents the best public policy for these movements.32 This
is attributable to a number of factors, including operational technological
developments,33 operational safety record,34 and general environmental
strengths.35 The section below provides a general overview of the common
applications and dangers of chlorine and anhydrous ammonia, two of the
most common—and most dangerous—hazmats shipped by rail.
A. Commonly Transported Hazmats
Although the term “hazmat shipments” may, for many, initially
evoke an image of exotic substances used in uncommon applications, this
could not be further from reality.36 Hazmats have very common uses, mak-
ing them indispensable to everyday life.37 As the American Chemistry
Council (“ACC”) points out:
Americans expect clean, safe water from our tap, access
to life-saving medications and medical devices, protective
equipment and body armor for our sons and daughters in
31 See McBride, Railroad Transportation, supra note 24, at 56 (“It is in the public interest
that railroads be obliged to carry these dangerous but essential substances because the
rail mode generally has been found to be the safest mode for that transportation.”).
32 See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Comments to Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, STB
Ex Parte No. 681, Class I Railroad Accounting and Financial Reporting—Transportation
of Hazardous Materials, at 4 (Feb. 4, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter USDOT
Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681].
33 See infra notes 113–116 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 108–112 and accompanying text.
35 See infra Part II.B.2.
36 See PHMSA—Definitions, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://phmsa.dot.gov/public/definitions
(last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (“Hazardous materials are vital to the nation’s economy, as
we all depend on these materials to heat our homes, provide fuel for our transportation
system, and deliver chemicals to enhance food production and drugs to diagnose and treat
illnesses.”).
37 See id. See also infra Parts II.A.1 (chlorine) and II.A.2 (anhydrous ammonia).
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military service and law enforcement, a safe and plentiful
food supply, aviation safety systems, computers and phones,
energy-saving solar panels, automobile safety systems and
child safety seats and more. Hazardous materials help pro-
duce the products that fulfill these expectations, and often,
there are no acceptable, non-hazardous substitutes that
ensure equal safety and performance.38
Some of the most commonly-used hazmat chemicals and their respective
applications are discussed below.
1. Chlorine
Among the most common hazmat shipments moved by rail is
chlorine, a TIH chemical.39 The American Chemistry Society (“ACS”)
reports that in 2008, 9.6 million metric tons of chlorine were produced in
the United States.40 Because of the economic recession and plant shut-
downs caused by two hurricanes,41 this figure represents a 10.8% decline
in production from 2007.42 Peak production of chlorine in the United States
for the past decade took place in 2000, when nearly 12.7 million metric
tons were produced.43
Chlorine gas (Cl2) has an incredibly broad array of modern-day
applications. As Brodsky explains:
The most important use of chlorine itself is as a disinfectant;
for example, chlorine is employed worldwide in drinking
water treatment facilities. In addition, chlorine derivatives
(materials containing chlorine atoms chemically bound to
other elements) are used as bleaching agents, construction
materials (especially polyvinyl chloride, or PVC), high purity
silicon precursors (e.g. trichlorosilane) for use in computer
38 Issue Brief—Hazmat Transportation Safety, AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, http://www
.americanchemistry.com/s_acc/sec_article_acc.asp?CID=634&DID=10020 (last visited
Feb. 20, 2011).
39 See 49 C.F.R. §§ 171.8, 172.101 (2009) (listing chlorine in the hazardous materials table).
40 Facts & Figures of the Chemical Industry, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, July 6,
2009, at 29, 56, available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/coverstory/87/pdf/8727production.pdf
[hereinafter 2008 Chemical Industry Facts & Figures].
41 Id. at 51.
42 Id. at 56.
43 Id.
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chip manufacture, pharmaceutical compounds (including
“blockbuster” drugs such as Singulair, Plavix, and Norvasc),
and many other functional materials.44
Additionally, the ACC states that a great deal of the products being used
in America’s push to go green require chlorine for their production; these
include “solar cells, wind-powered generators, hybrid cars, fiber optic
cables, low-energy appliances and light bulbs, energy-saving insulation,
[and] lightweight building materials,” among others.45 Currently, no safer
alternatives to chlorine exist for the purposes of manufacturing these
products.46
The consequences of a chlorine gas release are disastrous.47 Because
it is denser than air, chlorine disperses slowly in the event of a release.48 It
is a green-yellow gas, and it has a suffocating odor which can be detected
at a concentration of 0.31 ppm.49 Due to its water solubility, chlorine gas at
a concentration of 3 ppm irritates the mucous membranes.50 At concentra-
tions from 5–15 ppm, chlorine gas causes upper respiratory irritation, and
at a concentration of 30 ppm, chest pain, vomiting, and dyspnea occur.51
A 2005 train collision in Graniteville, S.C. demonstrates the very
real costs to human life and the overall environment associated with a
chlorine gas release. Around 2:39 a.m., a northbound Norfolk Southern
Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”) freight train (“train 192”) collided
with a parked train (“train P22”) in Graniteville, S.C.52 Train P22 was
parked on an industrial siding adjacent to Avondale Mills, Inc., a textile
manufacturer.53 The National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”)
44 Benjamin H. Brodsky, Issue Brief: Industrial Chemicals as Weapons: Chlorine, NUCLEAR
THREAT INITIATIVE (July 31, 2007), http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_89.html.
45 Issue Brief—Chlorine Rail Transportation Safety, AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, http://www
.americanchemistry.com/s_acc/sec_article_acc.asp?CID=634&DID=10018 (last visited
Feb. 20, 2011).
46 Id.
47 See Brodsky, supra note 44.
48 Id.
49 Technology Transfer Network Air Toxics Website: Chlorine, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/hlthef/chlorine.html#ref7 (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
50 Brodsky, supra note 44.
51 Id.
52 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT NTSB/RAR-05/04, COLLISION
OF NORFOLK SOUTHERN FREIGHT TRAIN 192 WITH STANDING NORFOLK SOUTHERN LOCAL
TRAIN P22 WITH SUBSEQUENT HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RELEASE AT GRANITEVILLE, SOUTH
CAROLINA, JANUARY 6, 2005, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2005/
RAR0504.pdf [hereinafter GRANITEVILLE ACCIDENT REPORT].
53 Id. at 1–2.
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determined the probable cause of the accident was “the failure of the
crew of Norfolk Southern train P22 to return a main line switch to the
normal position after the crew completed work at an industry track.”54
At the time of the collision, train 192 was traveling approximately
forty-seven miles per hour with two locomotives and forty-two freight cars
in its consist.55 Both of train 192’s locomotives and sixteen freight cars de-
railed as a result of the collision; three of the derailed cars were tank cars
carrying chlorine.56 One of these tank cars ruptured, releasing a cloud of
poisonous chlorine gas over the town.57 As the NTSB points out, “[t]he sud-
den release and expansion of the escaping gas caused the product remain-
ing in the tank to auto-refrigerate and remain in the liquid state, slowing
the release of additional gas.”58
As a result of the cloud of chlorine gas that settled over Graniteville,
nine people died, including the engineer of train 192, six Avondale Mills
employees, a truck driver near the plant, and a local resident.59 Another
554 people were taken to local hospitals complaining of difficulty breath-
ing; of that group, seventy-five were admitted for treatment.60
From a financial standpoint, damages were initially estimated as
exceeding $6.9 million.61 This figure, cited in the NTSB accident report,
most likely focuses only on physical damage to railroad equipment and
other physical damage at the accident site, as Norfolk Southern later esti-
mated overall exposure between $30 and $40 million.62 The railroad set-
tled a class-action lawsuit with the 5,400 people displaced by the accident,
agreeing to pay $2,000 to every household within a one-mile radius for
inconvenience and $200 per day for each person kept away from his or her
home during the cleanup effort.63 This settlement did not include those
who died or were hospitalized as a result of the chlorine release.64
In addition to the class-action lawsuit, Avondale Mills also brought
suit against Norfolk Southern seeking over $450 million for remediation
54 Id. at 56.
55 Id. at 1.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 11. “[T]he cloud extended at least 2,500 feet to the north; 1,000 feet to the east;
900 feet to the south; and 1,000 feet to the west.” Id.
58 GRANITEVILLE ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 52, at 11.
59 Id. at 17.
60 Id. at 18.
61 Id. at 20.
62 Norfolk Southern Tallies Cost of Train Wreck, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2005, at C4.
63 Rail Line Agrees to Pay Some Crash Victims, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2005, at A12.
64 Id.
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costs, as well as business interruption and valuation.65 Avondale Mills
also sought punitive damages.66 After four weeks of trial, this lawsuit
was settled for an undisclosed amount, with an unspecified portion of the
settlement to be paid directly by Norfolk Southern and added to its oper-
ating expenses.67
Within weeks of the announcement of the settlement of Avondale
Mills’ claims, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) brought suit against
Norfolk Southern alleging violations of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).68
Specifically, DOJ alleged that chlorine and diesel fuel reached nearby
Horse Creek, injuring and killing plants and wildlife.69 On March 8, 2010,
it was announced that Norfolk Southern agreed to pay a penalty of almost
$4 million for the CWA violations, to be deposited in the federal Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund.70 Additionally, the company agreed to provide special
incident training to its personnel and to invest additional money for replac-
ing the lost vegetation and wildlife.71
As noted earlier, the accident was caused by the failure of the crew
of train P22 to realign the main line switch to the normal position.72 Be-
cause the trackage in this area is non-signaled, train movements are gov-
erned by verbal authorities from dispatchers known as “track warrants.”73
In contrast, trackage using automatic block signaling involves trackside
signals that indicate to train crews whether the track ahead is clear.74
65 Firm Client Norfolk Southern Corporation Reaches Favorable Agreement with Avondale
Mills to Settle Claims from Graniteville Accident, HOLLINGSWORTH, LLP, http://www
.hollingsworthllp.com/news.php?NewsID=128 (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
66 Id.
67 News Release, Norfolk S. Corp., Norfolk Southern Reaches Agreement with Avondale
Mills to Settle Claims from Graniteville Accident (Apr. 7, 2008), http://www.nscorp.com/
nscportal/nscorp/Media/News%20Releases/2008/agreement.html.
68 Glenn Hess, U.S. Sues Norfolk Southern for Damages from Chemical Spill, CHEMICAL
& ENGINEERING NEWS (Apr. 29, 2008), available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/news/86/i18/
8618news4.html.
69 Id.
70 News Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Railroad Company to Pay $4 Million Penalty
for 2005 Chlorine Spill in Graniteville, SC (Mar. 8, 2010), http://yosemite.epa.gov/OPA/
ADMPRESS.NSF/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/18e25155f0e3cd90852576e
00066a885.
71 Id.
72 GRANITEVILLE ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 52, at 56.
73 Id. at 4.
74 Frank W. Bryan & Robert S. McGonigal, Railroad Signals: What They Do, What They
Mean, TRAINS MAGAZINE (May 1, 2006), available at http://www.trains.com/trn/default
.aspx?c=a&id=191.
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The display of a “clear” signal is predicated upon the passage of a low-
voltage electrical current through the rails of the block ahead.75 When a
train occupies the block, or a switch is not in the normal position, the block
is short-circuited, displaying a “stop” signal.76 Had this technology been
employed on the trackage through Graniteville, the crew of train 192 would
have encountered a stop signal and had ample time to stop in advance of
the switch to the Avondale Mills industrial track.77
2. Anhydrous Ammonia
Anhydrous ammonia is most commonly used as an agricultural
fertilizer and as an industrial refrigerant.78 Regarding its use in fertilizer
production, The Fertilizer Institute (“TFI”) points out, “[a]nhydrous ammo-
nia is the primary ingredient in all nitrogen fertilizers such as,[sic] urea
and urea ammonium nitrate solution (UAN) and is also used to produce
phosphate fertilizers such as diammonium phosphate (DAP) and mono-
ammonium phosphate (MAP).”79 As with many applications of chlorine,
there is no substitute for anhydrous ammonia in the fertilizer production
process.80 Aside from fertilizer production and industrial refrigeration,
anhydrous ammonia is also used in the production of synthetic fibers, in
mining operations, and in scrubbing nitric oxide and sulfur from the
emissions of coal-fired power plants.81
75 Id.
76 Id. See also GRANITEVILLE ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 52, at 36 (“In signaled territory,
the position of the switch is conveyed to the train crew through a corresponding wayside
signal.”).
77 Cf. GRANITEVILLE ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 52, at 47 (discussing examples of
possible means that could be implemented to avoid this type of accident). For additional
discussion on protective technology such as positive train control, which works in con-
junction with track signaling systems, see infra Part II.B.2.
78 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHEMICAL SAFETY ALERT: ANHYDROUS AMMONIA THEFT 1
(2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/OEM/docs/chem/csalert.pdf. More than 80% of the
anhydrous ammonia produced in the United States is used in agriculture, whereas less
than 2% is used as a refrigerant. Id. at 2. The EPA also points out that anhydrous ammonia
is a target of thieves because of its use as a key ingredient in manufacturing methamphet-
amines. Id. at 1.
79 THE FERTILIZER INSTITUTE, THE FERTILIZER INSTITUTE STATEMENT: RAIL TRANSPORTATION
OF ANHYDROUS AMMONIA MARCH 12, 2008 (2008), available at http://www.tfi.org/media
center/railstatement.pdf. TFI also points out that one railcar of ammonia makes enough
fertilizer to produce “128,000 bushels of corn, which can be used to feed approximately
1,600 head of beef or produce 345,600 gallons of ethanol.” Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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The ACS reports that in 2008, over 9.5 million metric tons of
anhydrous ammonia were produced in the United States.82 Similar to the
decline in the production of chlorine in 2008, anhydrous ammonia pro-
duction dropped 11.1% from 2007,83 with the combination of an economic
recession and natural disasters likely to blame.84
A release of anhydrous ammonia would pose serious health and
safety risks.85 Like chlorine, anhydrous ammonia affects the eyes, skin,
and lungs of humans exposed to it.86 At concentrations as low as 20 ppm,
its odor is detectable to humans, and at concentrations between 15% and
28% by volume in air, it is flammable.87 In concentrations of approximately
300 ppm, anhydrous ammonia is immediately dangerous to health and
safety.88 Unlike chlorine, anhydrous ammonia is lighter than air; in the
event of a release, the gas will rise if the air is dry, but if it is not, it will
“react[ ] immediately with the humidity in the air and may remain close
to the ground.”89
On January 18, 2002, a Canadian Pacific Railway (“Canadian
Pacific”) freight train derailed near Minot, N.D., causing a release of
anhydrous ammonia.90 Of the 112 cars on that particular train, thirty-one
derailed.91 Fifteen of the train’s cars contained anhydrous ammonia, five
of which were punctured during the derailment.92 From these five cars,
146,700 gallons of anhydrous ammonia were released.93 Immediately be-
fore the derailment, the crew recalled traveling over a “rough spot” in the
tracks, followed directly by the derailment.94 The NTSB determined the
82 2008 Chemical Industry Facts & Figures, supra note 40, at 56.
83 Id.
84 See id. at 51.
85 See Safety and Health Topics: Ammonia Refrigeration, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/ammoniarefrigeration/index.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Ammonia Refrigeration—Properties of Ammonia, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/ammonia_refrigeration/
ammonia/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
90 One Man Killed by Toxic Cloud in Rail Wreck, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at A10.
91 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT NTSB/RAR-04/01, DERAILMENT
OF CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY FREIGHT TRAIN 292-16 AND SUBSEQUENT RELEASE OF
ANHYDROUS AMMONIA NEAR MINOT, NORTH DAKOTA, JANUARY 18, 2002, at 1 (2004), available
at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/RAR0401.pdf [hereinafter MINOT ACCIDENT REPORT].
92 Id. at 1–2.
93 Id. at 5.
94 Id. at 3.
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probable cause of the accident was “an ineffective Canadian Pacific Railway
inspection and maintenance program that did not identify and replace
cracked joint bars before they completely fractured and led to the breaking
of the rail at the joint.”95 Additionally, the NTSB found that the accident
was made more severe by the catastrophic failure of the five tank cars that
released the anhydrous ammonia.96
As a result of the chemical release at Minot, one man died while
trying to flee the area, and 333 others sustained varying degrees of injury
associated with exposure to anhydrous ammonia gas.97 Of these, 312 were
residents who sustained non-fatal injuries.98
The derailment caused an estimated $2.49 million in damages to
railroad equipment, cargo, and track.99 As of the publication of the NTSB’s
accident report in early 2004, Canadian Pacific had paid over $8.39 million
in environmental remediation expenses including removal of contaminated
soil and ice, installation of monitoring wells, installation of groundwater
sumps, and installation and operation of a groundwater extraction system
at the site.100 Finally, two houses in a nearby neighborhood sustained dam-
ages as a result of the derailment: one was damaged by a piece of a tank car
that was propelled over 1/4 mile from the derailment; the other was struck
by a vehicle driven by the only person to die as a result of the incident.101
B. Modal Advantages of Rail
Transporting hazmats via rail represents the best public policy on
two levels: first, the overall safety record for rail freight transportation is
superior to that of other modes,102 and second, rail transportation of freight
far exceeds the fuel economy of other modes of transportation, thus giving
it the edge in minimizing environmental impacts.103 Examining the under-
lying basis for this policy determination is critical to this argument, as it
is important to understand that shifting hazmat shipments to other forms
95 Id. at 69. The derailment itself was likely caused by broken joint bars, where the rails
then separated. Id. at 68.
96 Id. at 69.
97 MINOT ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 91, at 10–11.
98 Id. at 11.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 12.
101 Id.
102 See infra Part II.B.1.
103 See infra Part II.B.2.
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of transportation is not in the best interests of the public.104 Instead, the
short-term focus should be on revising the liability regime for hazmat acci-
dents on rail, while simultaneously preventing a shift of hazmat shipments
to other, less safe modes of transportation.
1. Technological/Safety Advances
Despite a strong safety record, the rail industry has continually
taken steps to develop and implement technology that enhances industry
safety, both on its own accord and as a result of government mandates.105
Advancement in this area is driven by the dual, interrelated purposes of
preventing or mitigating hazmat releases in the event of an operational
accident (i.e., a derailment),106 as well as anti-terrorism considerations.107
The purpose of this section of the note is to provide an overview of rail-
roads’ safety record in moving hazmats and discuss the technological and
safety advances that continue to place the railroad industry in the best
position to deliver hazmats safely.
The AAR points out that “[i]n 2007, 99.996 percent of rail hazmat
shipments reached their destination without a release caused by a train
accident.”108 The 2007 safety record indicates a decrease of the accident
rate by 81% since 1980.109 The industry’s safety record is improved through
104 See McBride, Railroad Transportation, supra note 24, at 56 (“It is in the public interest
that railroads be obliged to carry these dangerous but essential substances because the
rail mode generally has been found to be the safest mode for that transportation.”). This
also reflects the wisdom inherent in the unique nature of the common carrier doctrine
applied only to railroads; specifically, the absence of parallel requirements for other modes
of transportation is purposeful, justified today by the unique characteristics of railroads
as well as the safety advantages discussed in this section.
105 See Testimony of Association of American Railroads before the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security
and Infrastructure Protection, Chemical Security: The Implementation of the Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard and the Road Ahead, at 2–4 (Dec. 12, 2007), http://www
.aar.org/en/Safety/~/media/aar/Testimony/Written/AAR_Testimony_ChemSec_121207
_FINAL.ashx [hereinafter Chemical Security—Road Ahead].
106 See Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432, 122 Stat. 4848 (2008)
(codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). This law endorses a railroad safety strategy
with multiple goals, including decreasing the number of derailments and other accidents.
See id. at § 102.
107 See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L.
No. 110-53, §§ 1516–1520, 121 Stat. 266, 437–444 (2007) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C.
§§ 1166–1169) (setting forth numerous provisions impacting rail transportation of hazmats,
including improved tank car testing and first responder training).
108 RAILROADS AND CHEMICALS, supra note 28, at 4.
109 Id.
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two major avenues: emergency preparedness and technological or opera-
tional improvements.110
The crucial role of emergency preparedness was brought to the fore
in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks; as a result, Congress
passed the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007, which, among other things, requires the Secretary of Homeland
Security to develop and conduct security exercises for railroads to assess
and improve capabilities to “prevent, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and
recover from acts of terrorism.”111 Although this provision is focused at re-
sponding to terrorist acts against railroad targets, it will provide valuable
preparation for non-terrorist-caused incidents as well because incidents
of both types will share similar characteristics in the railroad context. In
addition to legislatively-imposed emergency preparedness training, Class I
railroads have partnered with chemical manufacturers and distributors,
as well as emergency response and government agencies in TRANSCAER,
a national effort aimed at “assisting communities to prepare for and re-
spond to a possible hazardous material transportation incident.”112
On the technological and operational side are measures that dis-
tinguish the rail industry from other modes of transportation. Chief among
these is the development and implementation of positive train control
(“PTC”) technology, mandated by Congress in the Rail Safety Improvement
Act of 2008 (“RSIA”).113 In short, PTC technology acts as a layer of protec-
tion in addition to human crew members that functions through GPS, radio
communications, and on-board computer equipment interfacing with com-
puter systems at a traffic control center.114 PTC systems generally work
by monitoring train speed and position, warning train crews when they
are in danger of violating speed or authority limits, and initiating train
braking automatically if the train crew fails to respond appropriately.115
Under RSIA, the Secretary of Transportation is required to provide a plan
for the implementation of PTC technology on routes over which hazmats
110 See Chemical Security—Road Ahead, supra note 105, at 3–4.
111 6 U.S.C. § 1166(a) (Supp. II 2009).
112 Who We Are, TRANSCAER, http://www.transcaer.com/who-we-are (last visited Feb. 20,
2011).
113 Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 104, 122 Stat. 4848, 4856
(2008) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20157).
114 FED. R.R. ADMIN., COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF RAIL AND TRUCK FUEL EFFICIENCY ON
COMPETITIVE CORRIDORS 100 (2009), available at http://www.fra.dot.gov/Downloads/
Comparative_Evaluation_Rail_Truck_Fuel_Efficiency.pdf [hereinafter COMPARATIVE
EVALUATION].
115 Id.
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are shipped or routes shared by freight and regular passenger traffic no
later than December 31, 2015.116
2. Comparative Advantages
In addition to the emergency preparedness and technological and
operational measures that directly impact rail shipment of hazmats are
the general efficiency and environmental benefits to shipping freight via
rail.117 The Bureau of Transportation Statistics (“BTS”) provides some com-
pelling indicators of the strengths of railroads when compared to trucking,
the industry’s most direct competitor.118
Freight transportation fuel efficiency is calculated on the basis of
the number of miles a ton of freight is transported on a single gallon of
fuel; this is commonly referred to as a ton-mile per gallon (“TMPG”).119 A
variant on the TMPG is the revenue ton-mile per gallon (“RTMPG”).120 The
difference between the two is simple: RTMPG captures the fuel efficiency
of only revenue movements; in railroading, this is especially important
because of the need for movements of both empty cars and the railroad’s
own maintenance materials, including rail, ballast, and ties.121 The truck-
ing industry, in contrast, needs to take neither of these considerations
into account; trucks are often able to acquire new loads on return trips,122
and they bear no responsibility for construction or maintenance of the
government-provided roadways over which they drive (aside from paying
116 49 U.S.C. § 20157(a) (Supp. II 2009).
117 See ASS’N OF AM. R.R., FREIGHT RAILROADS HELP REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
1 (2010), available at http://www.aar.org/~/media/aar/backgroundpapers/freightrailroads
offerasmarteffectivewaytoreducegreenhousegasemissions.ashx [hereinafter FREIGHT RAIL-
ROADS HELP REDUCE GHG].
118 See, e.g., infra notes 123–124 and accompanying text.
119 SCOTT M. DENNIS, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, A DECADE OF GROWTH IN DOMESTIC
FREIGHT—RAIL AND TRUCK TON-MILES CONTINUE TO RISE (2007), available at http://www
.bts.gov/publications/special_reports_and_issue_briefs/special_report/2007_07_27/pdf/entire
.pdf; COMPARATIVE EVALUATION, supra note 114, at 74.
120 See Glossary, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Glossary
.asp?index=R (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (defining Revenue Ton Mile).
121 Travis Fain, 423 Miles a Gallon, LUCID IDIOCY (POLITICS) BLOG, Mar. 25, 2008, http://
www.reportingforhire.com/2008/03/423-miles-gallon.html (quoting Gary Sease, a CSX
spokesman, explaining the difference between TMPG and RTMPG).
122 See Penelope Patsuris, Wise Load: B2B Hits the Road, FORBES (Feb. 4, 2000), http://
www.forbes.com/2000/02/04/feat.html (pointing out that large U.S. carriers average 12%
of “empty miles” and describing how the National Transportation Exchange helps truckers
find return loads).
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taxes, of course). According to 2006 data from BTS, trucks achieved an
efficiency of just over 34 TMPG;123 railroads, by contrast, achieved an
efficiency of just over 422 RTMPG.124 The AAR reports that for 2009, U.S.
freight railroads moved one ton of freight an average of 480 miles per gal-
lon (up from 457 in 2008),” making railroads four times more fuel efficient
than trucks.125
A recent study provides a direct comparison of railroads and truck-
ing, analyzing and comparing fuel efficiency data for a selected group of
twenty-three “competitive corridors.”126 The results showed a stark con-
trast in the respective fuel efficiencies of rail and trucking; over the course
of the study, the rail movements examined produced a fuel efficiency range
of 156–512 TMPG, while comparable truck movements produced a fuel
efficiency range of 68–133 TMPG.127 In terms of actual fuel consumption
differences, this means that “[r]ail results in fuel savings when compared
to their counterpart truck movement, ranging from 18 to 1,108 gallons per
carload.”128 The report also provides a useful overview of the technology
that enables the stark differences in fuel efficiency between freight rail
and trucks.129
In addition to overall fuel efficiency considerations are disparities
in greenhouse gas emissions that further justify maximizing the utiliza-
tion of railroads for shipment of hazmats and other freight.130 For example,
in 2008, freight railroading was responsible for 2.4% of the transportation
sector’s greenhouse gas emissions; by contrast, trucking was responsible
for 21.5%.131 In terms of overall greenhouse gas emissions in the United
States in 2008, the freight rail industry contributed only 0.6%; trucking
contributed 5.8%.132
123 Truck Profile, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, http://www.bts.gov/publications/national
_transportation_statistics/html/table_truck_profile.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (calcu-
lated by dividing “Ton-miles” by “Fuel consumed, all trucks”).
124 Rail Profile, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, http://www.bts.gov/publications/national
_transportation_statistics/html/table_rail_profile.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (calculated
by dividing “Revenue ton-miles of freight” by “Fuel consumed in freight service”).
125 ASS’N OF AM. R.R., RAILROADS: GREEN FROM THE START 1 (2010), available at http://
www.aar.org/~/media/aar/backgroundpapers/railroadsgreenfromthestart.ashx.
126 COMPARATIVE EVALUATION, supra note 114, at 2.
127 Id. at 4.
128 Id. at 8.
129 See id. at 92–101.
130 See FREIGHT RAILROADS HELP REDUCE GHG, supra note 117, at 1–2.
131 Id. at 2.
132 Id. at 1.
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III. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM
As briefly mentioned in the introduction to this note, it is important
to keep in mind the scope of the argument presented here. The focus of this
note is a solution to the problem of potential tort liability forced upon rail-
roads by virtue of their status as common carriers. Tort reform to address
this problem is immediate, but short-term. The best long-term solution is
the substitution of safer chemicals wherever possible.133 Such substitu-
tions, over time, have the potential to either drastically limit the scope of
the problem as it exists today, or to render it altogether moot.
Important background considerations to any policy change in the
allocation of hazmat transportation costs were recently addressed by the
United States Department of Transportation (“USDOT”) and Norfolk
Southern.134 On one side is the policy judgment that rail is the safest mode
of transportation for hazmat shipments,135 and on the other is the under-
standing that development and implementation of inherently safer tech-
nologies is the ultimate solution to the poorly-allocated costs of hazmat
shipment present under the current liability regime.136 In light of this
issue, any reform, in order to be effective, must incentivize development
and implementation of inherently safer chemicals by chemical manufac-
turers and users137 and simultaneously avoid disincentivizing shipment of
hazmats via rail while reforming rail carrier exposure.138 Others, including
Union Pacific Railroad (“Union Pacific”), advocate the development of on-
site chemical production where feasible.139
A. Localized Regulation of Route Selection
A natural response to the problem discussed above is to allow local
governments to prevent the shipment of hazmat cargo through their respec-
tive jurisdictions.140 Doing so would presumably minimize the potential
133 See UNFAIR LIABILITY, supra note 3, at 1–2.
134 See USDOT Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681, supra note 32, Norfolk S. Ry. Co.
Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681, supra note 9.
135 USDOT Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681, supra note 32, at 4; see also supra Part II.B.
136 UNFAIR LIABILITY, supra note 3, at 1–2.
137 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
138 See USDOT Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681, supra note 32, at 4.
139 See Union Pacific Ry. Co., Written Testimony (Corrected) to Public Hearing STB Ex
Parte No. 677 (Sub No. 1), Common Carrier Obligation of Railroads—Transportation of
Hazardous Materials, at 6–8 (July 10, 2008) (on file with author).
140 But see UNFAIR LIABILITY, supra note 3, at 2.
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harms to concentrated population centers, a solution that is especially
attractive given the increasingly-salient concerns of terrorism.141 Second
(and more importantly here), this policy also has the potential to limit the
probability of an incredibly expensive hazmat accident in a dense urban
center; as a result, the financial risk posed to railroads in shipping these
chemicals would arguably decrease.142
However, taking a broader view of the impacts of local bans on haz-
mat shipments quickly reveals the fallacy of such a policy. Localized bans
on hazmat shipments create externalities in two important ways: first,
they lengthen the in-transit time for these shipments, which increases the
window in which a mishap can occur and is economically inefficient for
railroads and shippers alike; second, they merely shift the risks associated
with a hazmat release from one region and its population to another, doing
nothing to increase public safety on the whole.143
The experience of Washington, D.C. in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks provides an example of the shortcomings of using local prohibition
of hazmat shipments to protect the general public. On February 1, 2005,
the District of Columbia City Council passed the Terrorism Prevention in
Hazardous Materials Transportation Emergency Act of 2005 (“D.C. Act”).144
The D.C. Act created the Capitol Exclusion Zone covering the area within
2.2 miles of the U.S. Capitol building.145 Within this zone, shipment by rail
or truck of hazardous materials was prohibited without first obtaining a
permit from the D.C. Department of Transportation.146 Class I railroad CSX
operates major north-south and east-west rail arteries in the Washington,
D.C. area, both of which pass through the Capitol Exclusion Zone.147
After unsuccessfully seeking a preliminary injunction in the district
court to enjoin the enforcement of the D.C. Act, CSX appealed to the D.C.
141 See, e.g, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L.
No. 110-53, § 1551, 121 Stat. 266, 469 (2007) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 1201
(Supp. II 2009)) (requiring railroads to examine hazmat routing, as well as identify and
analyze alternative routings).
142 See Ass’n of Am. R.R., Written Testimony to Public Hearing STB Ex Parte No. 677 (Sub.
No. 1), Common Carrier Obligation of Railroads—Transportation of Hazardous Materials,
at 17–18 (July 10, 2008), available at http://www.aar.org/Safety/~/media/aar/Testimony/
Written/080722_STB_ERH_CommonCar_test.ashx (explaining that in densely populated
regions there is a greater potential for mass injury and billions of dollars in damages).
143 See UNFAIR LIABILITY, supra note 3, at 2.
144 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 406 F.3d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
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Circuit Court.148 Noting that the four-part test for preliminary injunctive
relief is flexible149 and that a particularly strong argument for one factor
may justify a preliminary injunction despite weak arguments for the
others,150 the D.C. Circuit reversed.151 In doing so, the court only addressed
CSX’s argument that the D.C. Act was preempted by the Federal Railroad
Safety Act (“FRSA”).152 Pursuant to section 434 of FRSA, “ ‘[l]aws, regu-
lations and orders related to railroad safety and laws, regulations, and
orders related to railroad security shall be nationally uniform to the extent
practicable.’ ”153 States are permitted to regulate in this area, if USDOT
or the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has not yet done
so, and even if a federal regulation exists, states may enact more stringent
regulations to address local safety or security hazards as long as they are
not incompatible with the existing federal regulation and “ ‘do[ ] not un-
reasonably burden interstate commerce.’ ”154 Ultimately, the court held
that CSX would likely prevail on the merits on the grounds that the D.C.
Act did not satisfy the requirements of this narrow exception.155
Despite its narrow scope, this ruling should serve as a bellwether
to other municipalities considering similar local bans. Although it was
the preemption argument that won the day for CSX, the negative public
policy effects of the course of action pursued by the D.C. City Council are
readily apparent. The D.C. Circuit observed, “[t]he effect of the D.C. Act,
however, is simply to shift this risk, or at least some of this risk, to
other jurisdictions.”156
Local bans on hazmat shipments have the effect of creating two-
tiered problems for rail carriers. First are the problems railroads could
face when reconciling these bans with their existing, federally-imposed
common carrier obligation to ship hazmats. Second are the onerous bur-
dens dictated by legislatively-imposed rerouting, which include increased
manpower, costly infrastructure upgrades, and an inevitable increase in
148 Id. at 669–70.
149 CSX Transp., Inc., 406 F.3d, at 670 (citing Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d
1313, 1317–18 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
150 Id. (citing CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C.
Cir. 1995)).
151 Id. at 674.
152 Id. at 669 & n.3 (noting that CSX also challenged the D.C. Act under the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act,
and the Commerce Clause of Article I, section 8 of the Constitution).
153 Id. at 670 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 20106).
154 Id. at 670–71 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 20106).
155 CSX Transp., Inc., 406 F.3d at 669 & n.3.
156 Id. at 674.
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in-transit time and travel distance for hazmat shipments.157 Additionally,
localized hazmat routing regulation will increase costs from the standpoint
of having to ensure both initial and continuing compliance with possibly
hundreds of local ordinances such as the D.C. Act.158
The detriment caused by locally-imposed bans on hazmat trans-
portation is a separate inquiry from the effects of the federally-imposed
requirement that railroads engage in evaluation of hazmat routing.159 The
key difference is that instead of handling the difficult task of achieving
compliance with route restrictions imposed by a potential multitude of
localities, this method allows railroads to engage in a more global, system-
wide analysis of the route selections used for hazmat shipments, guided by
a single set of criteria.160 Taking this approach will allow railroads to strike
an appropriate balance between utilizing the fastest routes and avoiding
densely-populated areas, where possible, which will in turn theoretically
minimize both in-transit time and the number of people who could be
affected in the event of a release-causing accident. The railroads, not indi-
vidual municipalities, are best suited at the task of hazmat route analysis
because of their ownership and operation of their routes and the broader
perspective they must have in transporting hazmats.
B. Modifying/Abolishing the Common Carrier Obligation
Another suggested reform is to simply limit the scope of the
common carrier obligations imposed on railroads with regard to hazmat
shipments. This would presumably give railroads greater freedom in
choosing whether to accept these potentially dangerous shipments, but
more negative effects will likely result. However, as discussed above, abo-
lition of the common carrier requirement is neither likely as a matter of
public policy nor as a reflection of economic reality.161
Recently, Union Pacific Railroad Company sought to limit the effect
of its common carrier obligations by petitioning the STB for a declaratory
order that it did not need to provide shipper rates for the transportation of
157 See, e.g., Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1180 (7th Cir.
1990) (discussing the difficulties of rerouting).
158 Presumably, ordinances could come from any trackside town or city concerned about
the possibly devastating effects of an accidental release of hazmat shipments while passing
through their respective jurisdictions. These concerns are almost certainly heightened
by devastation caused by the Graniteville or Minot accidents. See infra Part II.A.
159 See 49 C.F.R. § 172.820 (2009).
160 See id.
161 See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text; see also Part II.B.
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chlorine where other chlorine producers were closer in proximity to the
destinations of the shipments.162 Union Pacific’s request has generated
a flurry of criticism on a number of grounds. For instance, chemical pro-
ducers argue that granting Union Pacific’s petition would set a precedent
whereby railroads could gain de facto control over the scope of the mar-
kets served by chemical producers.163 This is especially problematic given
that chemical producers are largely concentrated in the Gulf States, the
Delaware Valley, and the Midwest.164 On June 11, 2009, the STB ruled
that Union Pacific must provide transportation rates and services for the
movements for which it originally denied service.165
Had the STB granted Union Pacific’s request for a declaratory order
allowing the company not to provide service and rates, it would have set
a dangerous precedent and given railroads far too much power. Accepting
Union Pacific’s argument would allow railroads to force—by selectively
refusing to ship hazmats from location A to location B—chemical producers
to decide whether to relocate facilities to more populated locations, close
existing facilities, or lose revenue from the sales in which the railroad re-
fuses to provide delivery.166 Additionally, this scenario would allow railroads
to micromanage the distribution decisions of the chemical industry, effec-
tively regionalizing it.167
In the case of U.S. Magnesium, allowing Union Pacific to refuse
shipment of chlorine from its Rowley, Utah facility to thirty-five Union
Pacific-served users would threaten the survival of the company as the
only producer of magnesium in the United States.168 This is due to the
fact that chlorine is a by-product of magnesium production, and if U.S.
Magnesium were unable to sell it, the company would be forced to “incur
162 See Union Pac. R.R. Co., Petition for a Declaratory Order, STB Finance Docket
No. 35219, at 1 (Feb. 18, 2009) (on file with author).
163 See, e.g., U.S. Magnesium, LLC, Comments in Opposition and Request for Order
Compelling UP to Provide Common Carrier Rates, STB Finance Docket No. 35219, at
8–11 (Mar. 23, 2009) (arguing that it is the common carrier doctrine that allows chemical
producers in “remote locations” to remain economically viable entities) [hereinafter U.S.
Magnesium Comments in STB FD No. 35219].
164 RAILROADS AND CHEMICALS, supra note 28, at 1.
165 Surface Transport. Bd., Decision in STB Finance Docket No. 35219, Union Pac. R.R.
Co. Petition for Declaratory Order, 2009 WL 1630587, at *4 (June 11, 2009). In reaching
its decision, the Board noted, “[i]n sum, [Union Pacific] has not shown that USM’s requests
for rates and service are unreasonable.” Id.
166 See U.S. Magnesium Comments in STB FD No. 35219, supra note 163, at 9–11.
167 See Verified Statement of Dr. Howard Kaplan to Surface Transp. Bd., STB Finance
Docket 35219, in U.S. Magnesium Comments in STB FD No. 35219, supra note 163, at 7–8.
168 See id. at 2,4; U.S. Magnesium Comments in STB FD No. 35219, supra note 163, at 4–5.
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the costs of scrubbing the chlorine, or pay monetary penalties,” changing
the character of its chlorine by-products from a revenue-generator to a
source of additional operating expenses.169
C. Capping Damages
A statutory cap on damages is suggested as a means of preventing
railroads from suffering ruinous tort damages stemming from cargo for
which they were prohibited from denying carriage.170 This could take place
in one of two ways: first, a cap can be placed on the damages to be paid by
a railroad on a per-incident basis, or second, a cap can be placed on the
damages to be received by individual successful litigants.
Either proposal is subject to criticism in that it is extremely diffi-
cult to devise a meaningful method of determining the maximum dam-
ages to be awarded in the event of a future release of hazmats while on
rail.171 As a result, placing a cap on damage awards is nothing more than
a case of arbitrary line-drawing. Consider, for instance, the gap between
the estimated costs of the railroads’ “nightmare scenario” ($5–6 billion)172
and the $10.88 million spent by Canadian Pacific in rectifying damages
resulting from its 2002 derailment in Minot.173 Given the disparity of these
two figures, devising a meaningful damages cap at either the individual
litigant or accident levels may be impossible.
Capping the damages to be paid by a railroad on a per-incident
basis is problematic. A multitude of factors directly affect the damages
caused by a release, including the population density in which the release
occurred, the hazmat released (and its individual properties), as well as
the quantity released.174 It necessarily follows that it will quickly become
virtually impossible to create a statutory cap that balances the public
interest in being compensated for injuries it sustains with the interest of
railroads in being forced to pay only reasonable damage awards.
169 U.S. Magnesium Comments in STB FD No. 35219, supra note 163, at 3.
170 E.g., Stephen J. Foland, Note, Common Carriage and Liability in the Rail Transportation
of Toxic Inhalation Hazard Materials, 8 AVE MARIA L. REV. 197, 219 (2009).
171 Cf. Ryan T. Emery, Unwise and Unnecessary: Statutory Caps on Non-Economic Damages
in Medical Malpractice Cases and the Appellate Review Alternative, 69 ALB. L. REV. 913,
926 (2006) (discussing similar difficulties of determining a reasonable statutory cap on
damages in the context of medical malpractice).
172 McBride, supra note 4, at 100 & n.15.
173 See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., Foland, supra note 170, at 197, 205–06, 209–10 (discussing the various factors
and results involved in a series of rail accidents involving hazmats).
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The second method addresses some of the uncertainties of the first,
but capping damages at the individual litigant level has its own shortcom-
ings. These can be seen when this method is analogized to existing damage
award caps in medical malpractice suits in some states.175 Most often, the
problem targeted by these caps is noneconomic damages awards consid-
ered unpredictable, excessively large, and further departed from their
doctrinal roots.176
It is important to note that Mississippi’s cap on medical malpractice
excludes punitive and exemplary damages from its damage cap.177 Like-
wise, a cap on railroads’ damages resulting from hazmat releases could
leave punitive damages available to litigants in the hypothetical case whose
facts meet the hornbook tort definition for punitive damages: “conduct
that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless
indifference to the rights of others.”178
If one were to apply a limit to punitive damages in this context,
however, it would do little to address the problem, as between January and
October 2009, only 31.8% of the 1722 railroad accidents occurring during
that period were caused by “human error.”179 The most prevalent accident
causes are track defects and human error (31.8% each), followed by miscel-
laneous causes (13.0%), equipment failures (13.0%), highway-rail collisions
(8.0%), and finally, signal malfunctions (2.4%).180 Additionally, it is unclear
how many of the above-referenced human-error-caused accidents involve
conduct that rises to the level of “evil motive or . . . reckless indifference”
necessary to justify the imposition of punitive damages. It is more likely
that most, if not all of these, are a result of conduct that is better described
175 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60 (West 2010) (defining and limiting noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice cases).
176 See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering
Awards: Turning Compensation into “Punishment,” 54 S.C. L. REV. 47, 48, 50–52 (2002)
(discussing the departure of American courts from “the historical ‘intentional tort’ moorings
of punitive damages”).
177 MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60(1)(a) (West 2010) (“The term ‘noneconomic damages’ shall
not include punitive or exemplary damages.”).
178 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
179 See Accident Causes, OFFICE OF SAFETY ANALYSIS, FED. R.R. ADMIN., http://safetydata
.fra.dot.gov/officeofsafety/publicsite/Query/inccaus.aspx (select the month “January” and
the year “2009” as the “start date” and select the month “October” and the year “2009” as
the “end date.”) (last accessed January 21, 2010) (calculated by adding the totals in each
individual accident type category). Note these numbers are current as of January 21, 2010.
Because additional information about accidents during the relevant period may be re-
ported to the administration at later times, slight fluctuations of these data are possible
in the future.
180 Id. These categories are also defined at this site.
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as negligence, at worst.181 Given this limitation and the prevalence of
accidents caused by something other than human error, targeting puni-
tive damage awards against railroads in hazmat accident cases would do
little to nothing to address the hypothetical accidents in which a hazmat
release could occur.
In a hazmat release, like in other toxic torts, a particularly impor-
tant damages issue involves emotional distress claims. As Tuohey and
Gonzalez point out, “[t]he fear and horror of personally being exposed to
a cloud of poison gas, or knowing that family members have been exposed,
are absolute emotional trauma in its purest form.”182 This added dimension
further complicates—perhaps prohibitively so—the already complex task
of meaningfully estimating damages for the purpose of devising a statu-
tory cap. This is due in large part to the skepticism of the law toward the
genuineness of emotional distress claims generally, and this skepticism re-
mains present in toxic tort cases.183 As a result, the law generally requires
physical manifestations in order for a plaintiff to succeed on a claim of
emotional distress.184 The subjective nature of emotional distress, coupled
with the sizeable role of emotional distress in hazmat accidents further
undermines the case for a statutory cap on damages in these accidents.
Aside from the method of capping damages chosen in a hypothetical
system, and in addition to the difficult task of meaningfully estimating
damages, there remain serious questions as to the constitutional validity
of a cap on damages. Recently, in Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, the
Illinois Supreme Court overturned a state statute limiting non-economic
damages in a manner similar to that found in Mississippi.185 The Lebron
court reached its conclusion on separation of powers principles, stating
that the cap on damages “violates the separation of powers clause of the
181 See, e.g., GRANITEVILLE ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 52, at 56; MINOT ACCIDENT
REPORT, supra note 91, at 69 (describing the probable causes of each accident). The NTSB’s
accident report for the Minot accident provides a useful illustration of this point. There,
the Board identified the failure of Canadian Pacific’s inspection and maintenance program
to detect deteriorating track conditions as probable cause of that accident. MINOT ACCIDENT
REPORT, supra note 91, at 69. This characterization clearly satisfies the Restatement’s
definition of negligence: “conduct which falls below the standard established by law for
the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 282 (1965).
182 Conrad G. Tuohey & Ferdinand V. Gonzalez, Emotional Distress Issues Raised by the
Release of Toxic and Other Hazardous Materials, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 661, 721 (2001).
183 Id. at 724.
184 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1984)).
185 Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914, 917 (Ill. 2010) (applying the
Illinois constitution).
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Illinois Constitution”186 because it “unduly encroaches upon the funda-
mentally judicial prerogative of determining whether a jury’s assessment
of damages is excessive within the meaning of the law.”187
While the Lebron decision represents one state supreme court’s in-
terpretation vis-à-vis its own constitution, the broad principle of separa-
tion of powers, relied upon by the court, poses a real threat to the validity
of any statutory cap on damages in the context of rail transportation of
hazmats. Similarly, it is foreseeable that a cap on damages is subject to
attack from aggrieved plaintiffs, under the very same arguments adopted
by the court in Lebron.
The flaws of a statutory cap on damages in this context, including
the difficulty in devising a meaningful damages cap, the issue of emotional
distress damages (especially relevant in toxic tort cases such as hazmat
transportation), and questions of constitutional validity on separation of
powers grounds necessitate looking to other means to reform rail carrier
liability for hazmat accidents.
D. Redefining Shipping Rates for Regulatory Purposes
Another alternative is to redefine railroad shipping rates for
hazmat cargo in order to better share the costs of transportation with the
producers and users of these chemicals.188 This proposal, currently before
the STB, entails a redefinition of the STB’s accounting mechanisms for
hazmat shipments.189 Although at first glance this proposal appears to im-
plicate no more than private party contract negotiations between railroads
and shippers, in practice, implementation of this proposal requires gov-
ernment action because shipping rates are regulated by the STB.190 The
existing accounting system and its regulatory uses are best explained by
the USDOT:
Class I rail carriers file accounting and financial informa-
tion into the Board’s Uniform System of Accounts (“USOA”)
on an annual basis, which is used by the agency’s Uniform
186 Id. at 903.
187 Id. at 906 (quoting Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367, 414 (1997)).
188 See generally STB Ex Parte No. 681 ANPR, supra note 12.
189 See id.
190 See, e.g., Surface Transp. Bd., Adoption of the Uniform Railroad Costing System as a
General Purpose Costing System for All Regulatory Costing Purposes, 5 I.C.C.2d 894,
898–99 (Sept. 8, 1989) (“Accordingly, we are adopting and implementing URCS . . . as the
Commission’s general purpose costing system for all regulatory costing purposes.”).
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Railroad Costing System (“URCS”) to determine the carriers’
variable costs for regulatory purposes, including adjudica-
tion of charges that rail rates are unreasonably high.191
As the period for comment has closed,192 discussion and evaluation of the
prudence of amending the URCS to allocate for hazmat shipment costs has
the benefit of several industry voices.193
In its current form, the URCS fails to take into account several
unique costs incurred by railroads arising from routine hazmat transpor-
tation movements. These include increased operating costs caused by a
government-mandated maximum speed limit for hazmat shipments that
can cause congestion and delays on lines operating near capacity and the
requirement that hazmat-containing cars never be “left unattended” while
“being transferred within a High Threat Urban Areas [sic].”194
One clear benefit of a revision to the URCS is that it would enable
railroads to separate costs associated with shipment of hazmats; doing so
would allow the hazmat shippers to pay the costs generated by their ship-
ments, while preventing shippers of other, non-dangerous materials from
bearing these costs.195 However, the glaring, fatal flaw in the revision of
URCS to redefine hazmat shipment costs is that it fails to consider the pos-
sibility of a catastrophic chemical release196 on a scale greater than the
191 USDOT Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681, supra note 32, at 1.
192 STB Ex Parte No. 681 ANPR, supra note 12, at 1 (indicating that the period for comment
closed on February 4, 2009).
193 See List of Filings in STB Ex Parte No. 681, SURFACE TRANSP. BD., http://www.stb.dot
.gov/filings/all.nsf/(Personal-128.239.166.99)?OpenView&Count=300 (last visited Feb. 20,
2011). These include: Class I Railroads Norfolk Southern, Union Pacific, BNSF, and
Canadian Pacific; the Association of American Railroads; and a shippers’ group comprised
of the American Chemistry Council, the Chlorine Institute, the Fertilizer Institute, and the
Edison Electric Institute; and other interested parties. Id.
194 Ass’n of Am. R.R., Comments to Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, STB Ex
Parte No. 681, Class I Railroad Accounting and Financial Reporting—Transportation of
Hazardous Materials, at 11–12 (Feb. 4, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter AAR
Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681].
195 Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., Comments to Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, STB
Ex Parte No. 681, Class I Railroad Accounting and Financial Reporting—Transportation
of Hazardous Materials, at 4 (Feb. 4, 2009) (on file with author). The URCS, in its current
form, inevitably leads to the costs of hazmat shipments being passed on to all rail shippers,
because of the inability of this model to accurately capture the unique costs associated with
hazmat shipment. Id. (quoting the transcript from Public Hearing STB Ex Parte No. 677
(Sub No. 1), Common Carrier Obligation of Railroads—Transportation of Hazardous
Materials (July 10, 2008)).
196 See AAR Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681, supra note 194, at 10.
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one that took place in Graniteville, S.C. in 2005197 or near Minot, N.D. in
2002.198 In such a scenario, even a revised URCS is ill-equipped to provide
meaningful change.199 Because URCS is only designed to allocate trans-
portation costs resulting from shipment of freight, a revision to URCS
to address hazmat shipment costs by railroads still fails to address the
greatest problem associated with these movements: insurance costs.200
An additional problem presented by a proposed revision to the
URCS model is the sheer complexity associated with devising a new model
that actually captures the costs associated with hazmat shipments.201 As
BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”) observes:
[An attempt to adjust URCS] would require complicated
and potentially burdensome special studies to identify the
full range of TIH-specific costs, to determine methodologies
for allocating portions of railroad operating and capital ex-
penditures to TIH and non-TIH commodities and to deter-
mine appropriate adjustment factors within URCS to
allocate those costs to individual TIH movements.202
Further problems in such an undertaking include the inability of rail-
roads to meaningfully estimate their regulatory compliance costs, as these
frequently evolve.203
Additionally, a coalition of shippers has attacked the idea of reform-
ing the URCS for hazmat shipments as being a far too focused endeavor
that overlooks broader systemic flaws in the URCS model.204 For example,
they point out that the most recent adjustment to the URCS model for
intermodal traffic205 occurred in 1997, and it failed to take into account the
197 See supra Part II.A.1.
198 See supra Part II.A.2.
199 See, e.g., BNSF Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681, supra note 6, at 6–7. As BNSF
Railway Company points out, revising the URCS still does nothing to change the shortfall
in insurance coverage faced by railroads shipping hazmats, let alone the allocation of these
costs to the shippers who truly generate them. Id.
200 See id. at 6.
201 Id. at 8.
202 Id.
203 See id.
204 See generally Shipper Orgs.’ Joint Submission, Comments to Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, STB Ex Parte No. 681, Class I Railroad Accounting and Financial Reporting—
Transportation of Hazardous Materials (Feb. 4, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Shipper Organizations’ Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681].
205 Intermodal traffic is defined as “the long-haul movement of shipping containers or truck
trailers by rail, combined with a (usually much shorter) truck movement at one or both
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now common practice of double-stacking containers.206 This is especially
problematic given that intermodal shipments accounted for over 20% of
rail revenue in 2009.207 As further support for their argument that the en-
tire system is flawed, the shippers group cited an independent study of
railroad costs finding that the URCS model overestimated actual costs
by over double in some cases.208
Despite the competing arguments for and against revising the
URCS model for hazmat movements, the model is ill-suited to address the
allocation of liability in the event of a catastrophic release, the problem on
which this note focuses. Separate and apart from catastrophic release costs,
there appears to be agreement between the railroads and the shippers that
the URCS model is in dire need of comprehensive review and revision, for
other reasons.209
E. Liability Backstop
The final policy proposal this note discusses is the creation and
implementation of a liability backstop that mirrors the structure and
function of the Price-Anderson Act in the nuclear energy industry. This
section provides an overview of the basics of the Price-Anderson Act, criti-
cism of the Act, discussion of the function of the Act in response to the
Three-Mile-Island Incident, as well as discussion of importing this model
into the railroad industry, thereby creating a liability backstop for rail
transportation of hazmats.
1. The Price-Anderson Act
In the United States, nuclear energy producers benefit from a
liability backstop created by the Atomic Energy Damages Act in 1957.210
The Act had dual purposes: first, it aimed to “encourage development of
the nuclear [power] industry by providing . . . financial protection” in the
ends.” ASS’N OF AM. R.R., RAIL INTERMODAL KEEPS AMERICA MOVING 1 (2010), available
at http://www.aar.org/InCongress/~/media/AAR/BackgroundPapers/Intermodal%20Nov
%202009.ashx [hereinafter RAIL INTERMODAL KEEPS AMERICA MOVING].
206 Shipper Organizations’ Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681, supra note 204, at 3.
207 RAIL INTERMODAL KEEPS AMERICA MOVING, supra note 205, at 1.
208 Shipper Organizations’ Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681, supra note 204, at 8.
209 See AAR Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681, supra note 194, at 16–17; Shipper
Organizations’ Comments to STB Ex Parte No. 681, supra note 204, at 2.
210 Atomic Energy Damages Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006)). The statute is most commonly referred to as the
Price-Anderson Act.
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event of an accident; second, it intended to protect injured members of the
public by “assuring that funds are available to compensate victims . . . in
the event of a nuclear incident.”211
The United States Department of Agriculture succinctly described
the basic procedural contours of the liability regime created by the Price-
Anderson Act:
• Jurisdiction is automatically transferred to federal
courts no matter where the accident occurred.
• All claims from the same incident are consolidated
into one Federal court, which is responsible for pri-
oritizing payouts and sharing funds equitably should
there be a shortfall.
. . .
• An open-ended time limit is applied, which allows
claimants three years to file a claim starting from
the time they discover damage.212
In addition to these characteristics is the waiver of defenses for licensed
nuclear reactor operators that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”)
is empowered to require to be incorporated in nuclear insurance con-
tracts.213 Specifically, it provides that indemnified entities are required
to waive “any issue or defense as to conduct of the claimant or fault of
persons indemnified” as well as “any issue or defense as to charitable or
governmental immunity.”214 The waiver of defenses mandated by the Act
imposes upon licensees the tort concept of strict liability.215 Finally, the Act
provides that attorneys’ fees may be recovered under the Act, provided
that specified conditions are met.216
Another key defining feature of the Price-Anderson Act is the two-
tiered insurance program it implements. First, the Act requires licensees
211 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT 4–5 (1999),
available at http://www.gc.energy.gov/documents/paa-rep.pdf.
212 U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, Comments to Public Hearing, STB Ex Parte No. 677 (Sub
No. 1), Common Carrier Obligation of Railroads—Transportation of Hazardous Materials,
at 4 (July 22, 2008) (on file with author).
213 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (2006).
214 Id.
215 Michael G. Faure & Tom Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative
Economic Analysis of the U.S. and International Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 263 (2008).
216 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210 (o)(1)(D), (o)(2) (2006).
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to obtain the maximum available insurance, currently $300 million, as well
as secondary coverage, in the event that primary coverage is insufficient
to cover damages resulting from a nuclear accident.217 Secondary coverage
is achieved through “an industry retrospective rating plan providing for
premium charges deferred in whole or major part until public liability from
a nuclear incident exceeds or appears likely to exceed the level of the pri-
mary financial protection required of the licensee involved in the nuclear
incident,” subject to several conditions.218 The most important of these con-
ditions is that a licensee cannot be required to pay a deferred premium
of more than $95.8 million in any given incident.219 The financial advan-
tage of the current structuring of the secondary insurance pool is that no
premiums are paid, as long as a covered accident does not occur.220
With 103 commercial reactors operating in the United States today,
the two-tiered system would absorb nuclear accident liability up to $10.17
billion.221 In the event that damages exceed the maximum amount covered
by the primary and secondary layers of insurance, public liability is capped
at approximately $500 million.222 Finally, in the event that the first three
layers of financial protection are insufficient, Congress is empowered to
take action to ensure the public is compensated for all claims resulting
from the accident.223
Critics such as the interest group Public Citizen have attacked
the Price-Anderson Act as a “Billion Dollar Bailout for Nuclear Power
Mishaps” (long before the term “bailout” became a common part of today’s
vernacular),224 while supporters such as the Nuclear Energy Institute de-
fend it as imposing zero cost on consumers of nuclear energy.225 Comparing
the Price-Anderson Act to analogous European liability regimes, Faure
and Vanden Borre observe:
217 See 10 C.F.R. § 140.11(a)(4) (2009).
218 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1) (2006).
219 Id.
220 Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 215, at 271.
221 McBride, supra note 4, at 99 & n.14. This is calculated by adding the required primary
insurance amount ($300 million) to the total capability of the secondary insurance available
(the product of $95.8 million times 103 licensees). Id.
222 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(1)(C)(i) (2006).
223 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2) (2006).
224 See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, PRICE-ANDERSON ACT: THE BILLION DOLLAR BAILOUT FOR
NUCLEAR POWER MISHAPS 1 (2004), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Price
%20Anderson%20Factsheet.pdf.
225 See, e.g., Price-Anderson Act Provides Effective Liability Insurance at No Cost to the
Public, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (June 2010), http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/
documentlibrary/safetyandsecurity/factsheet/priceandersonact.
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Even though we have indicated that it is hard to make a
final, positive judgement on the U.S. compensation regime
given the fact that the real costs of a nuclear damage can
still be higher than the compensation available, the U.S. re-
gime seems in many respects to be more in line with the law
and economics literature with respect to nuclear liability.226
Aside from these defenses and criticisms of the Price-Anderson Act, there
is at least limited, practical evidence that the system succeeds in achieving
its function.227
The Price-Anderson Act has only been used once, in response to
the Three-Mile Island incident in 1979.228 At the time of that incident, the
primary insurance pool was $140 million.229 Upon receiving news of the
accident, nuclear industry insurers organized a central claims office in
nearby Harrisburg, PA where they advanced living expenses to those dis-
placed from their homes.230 Additionally, 636 people received compensation
for lost wages resulting from the accident.231 As the last of the litigation
involving this accident concluded in 2003, it is clear now that $71 million
in damages and litigation costs were paid.232 This amount is only slightly
more than half of the primary level insurance required at the time.233
2. Creating an Analogue to the Price-Anderson Act
Drawing upon the experience gained through the creation, imple-
mentation, and administration of the Price-Anderson Act, an analogous
“Railroad Hazmat Transportation Act” can successfully address the prob-
lem created by railroads’ common carrier obligations as applied to hazmats,
while still remaining responsive and sensitive to the sometimes competing
interests of consumers, shippers, and of course, the railroads.234 While
nuclear energy production and rail transportation of hazmat shipments do
not seem to lend themselves to an “apples to apples” comparison, enough
parallels between the two exist to nonetheless provide a meaningful
226 Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 215, at 276.
227 See id. at 287.
228 See Price-Anderson Act Provides Effective Liability Insurance, supra note 225.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 See id.
234 See generally McBride, supra note 4.
1006 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 35:973
analogy.235 At the broader policy level, a railroad analogue to the Price-
Anderson Act could easily import the Act’s guiding principles by protect-
ing the public in the event of a catastrophic release while simultaneously
providing railroads protection for socially beneficial, but dangerous, hazmat
transportation in order to keep these shipments on rail, where the public
is best protected.
McBride makes a critical observation in considering whether and
how to import the liability backstop model found in the Price-Anderson
Act to railroad transportation of hazmats:
[T]he Price-Anderson Act, as amended, is not simply a
limit on the liability of those involved with nuclear power
plants and transportation of nuclear materials (including
railroads). . . . [I]t is part of a comprehensive regulatory,
safety, insurance and waiver of defenses approach intended
to assure safety of nuclear facilities and expedite compen-
sation if accidents occur.236
In that vein, it is important to keep in mind the disparity in the respective
resources and scope of the FRA and the NRC, which is “considered by
nearly all accounts the most comprehensive regulator of any American
industry.”237 This is likely explained by the difference in perceived risk
between nuclear power generation and freight railroading.
Employing the two-tiered Price-Anderson structure in this context
encounters some difficulties, due to the major difference between the
number of nuclear reactor licensees (103) and the number of Class I freight
railroads (7).238 This difference becomes especially problematic in the con-
text of the secondary level of coverage, where other industry members
share the burdens of indemnification. First, McBride explains that based
on testimony before the STB, railroads are able to obtain primary “commer-
cial hazard insurance in excess of $1 billion per event.”239 To cover the re-
maining $4–5 billion of outstanding liability from the “nightmare scenario,”
he suggests $600–700 million per railroad to provide the secondary level
235 See id. at 99.
236 Id. at 93.
237 Id. at 94.
238 See McBride, supra note 4, at 99. McBride also notes that a hypothetical rail analogue
to Price-Anderson would necessarily be limited to Class I railroads, given that Class II and
III railroads are financially incapable of contributing significantly to the second-tier of
insurance. See id.
239 Id. at 100 n.15.
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of insurance.240 Comparing that figure—$600–700 million—to the $30–40
million incurred by Norfolk Southern as a result of the Graniteville colli-
sion241 or the $10.88 million incurred by Canadian Pacific as a result of the
Minot derailment,242 it becomes plainly obvious that the secondary level
of insurance described in McBride’s hypothetical makes little practical
sense. In order to lower secondary-level exposure to more realistic amounts,
the risk pool should be expanded to include hazmat chemical producers who
utilize rail transportation. This can be accomplished through a licensing
requirement where permission to ship hazmats in interstate commerce
via rail is conditioned upon acceptance of the two-tiered liability backstop
and its waiver of defenses approach.
Conceptually, legislatively aligning the interests of the Class I rail-
roads by creating a secondary retrospective insurance pool would not set
a new precedent with regard to railroad industry cooperation; it already
takes place in equipment sharing and leasing, as well as through participa-
tion in joint community preparedness programs such as TRANSCAER.243
Including hazmat producers who ship by rail in the second level is
the key to making a liability backstop system work for rail transportation
of hazmats. Their inclusion makes second-level exposure more realistic
than it would be with only the seven Class I railroads. It also recognizes
the key difference between nuclear power generation and hazmat trans-
portation; while both are dangerous, hazmat transportation is unique in
that producers presumably have the ability to develop the inherently safer
chemicals that could one day replace the highly dangerous chemicals cur-
rently in use.244 Imposing the possibility of secondary-level liability for
chemical producers is a financial incentive to chemical companies to pro-
duce safer chemicals. By doing so, they will also necessarily limit their own
exposure in this secondary level of insurance, because fewer hazmats will
travel over the rails as these replacements occur.
Creation of an analogue to the Price-Anderson Act to address rail
transportation of hazmats would not break new ground by foreclosing
railroads from asserting certain defenses in litigation, although the lia-
bility backstop proposed here does so much more broadly. The Federal
Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) does just that in a more limited sense,
as it prevents railroads from asserting the defense of assumption of the risk
240 Id.
241 Norfolk Southern Tallies Cost of Train Wreck, supra note 62.
242 See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
243 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
244 See UNFAIR LIABILITY, supra note 3, at 2.
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when sued by employees for negligence.245 In addition, importing the other
procedural basics of the Price-Anderson Act (federal district court juris-
diction, consolidation of claims, and a three-year statute of limitations246)
pose little problem in this context.
In the post 9/11 era, terrorist acts present a problem that, although
certainly not unique to hazmat transportation, should be considered more
closely in this context than it is in the nuclear energy industry.247 The
reason for this is based on the nature of each industry: the rail network is
largely open,248 whereas nuclear power facilities are required to be exten-
sively protected and fortified.249 Comparing the CSX freight line through
Washington, D.C. which passes within four blocks of the U.S. Capitol
building with the aircraft-resistant nuclear power plants illustrates this
point.250 In the Price-Anderson Act, “an act of war” is excluded from the
definition of “public liabilities” that trigger the Act’s claims process.251
While consideration of the issue of “what is war” is incredibly important
when deciding whether terrorist acts are included in the indemnification
provisions of the Price-Anderson Act, it is beyond the scope of this note.
However, this definitional difficulty and the problem of a third party cause
of what would otherwise be a strict liability tort must be taken into con-
sideration when considering the mechanics of a liability backstop for rail
transportation of hazmats.
The benefits to be reaped by developing and implementing a liabil-
ity backstop for the rail transportation of hazmats include: the lack of a
need for the difficult line-drawing associated with modifying the common
carrier obligation of railroads; the ability of railroads to fulfill their com-
mon carrier obligation without the economic uncertainty of not having ade-
quate insurance coverage; a streamlined, statutory-driven claims process;
and a better allocation of the costs of hazmat shipments between shippers,
users, and carriers.
Additionally, implementing a liability backstop will actually address
one of the shortcomings of a statutory cap on damages. A cap on damages
requires making a policy judgment that balances the directly contradictory
interests of injured parties seeking redress for damages resulting from a
245 45 U.S.C. § 54 (2006).
246 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
247 See, e.g., Brodsky, supra note 44 (discussing the use of industrials chemicals as weapons).
248 Id.
249 See generally 10 C.F.R. § 73.50 (2009).
250 See Brodsky, supra note 44.
251 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w)(ii) (2006).
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hazmat-related railroad accident and railroads seeking to limit their ex-
posure for a financial risk they had no choice in undertaking at the outset.
If properly devised, a liability backstop will allow both of these parties to
protect their respective interests. Members of the general public will be
assured, knowing that in the event they sustain damages as a result of a
hazmat-related railroad accident, they will receive compensation for their
injuries. Railroads transporting hazmat shipments will be able to operate
with the certainty of knowing the extent of their financial exposure result-
ing from hazmat transportation.
CONCLUSION
The common carrier doctrine, when applied to the shipment of
hazmats, gives rise to the potential for liability in the billions of dollars
for the railroads required to undertake this transportation.252 The solu-
tion is not as simple as simply ceasing use of these chemicals; they play
a key role in water purification, manufacturing processes, and agriculture,
just to name a few.253 The availability—and hence, shipment—of these
chemicals is absolutely necessary to everyday life as it is known today, but
past accidents involving hazmats released in the course of rail transporta-
tion demonstrate the human, environmental, and financial dangers these
movements pose.254
Despite accidents in the past, railroads are best suited for hazmat
transportation because of their overall safety record, the development of
safety technology that improves upon railroad operations, and environ-
mental benefits related largely to fuel efficiency.255 The only true “solution”
to the problem caused by the liability potential resulting from common car-
rier doctrine applied to hazmats is the development and implementation
of cost-effective, safer chemicals.256 In the interim, the liability regime for
rail accidents involving hazmat releases must be reformed in order to re-
store some semblance of financial predictability to this incredibly integral
component of everyday life.
Allowing local municipalities to regulate route selection through
“hazmat bans” or stringent permitting processes brings far more detri-
ments than benefits, as it would cause much higher compliance costs by
252 See UNFAIR LIABILITY, supra note 3, at 1.
253 See, e.g., AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, supra note 38.
254 See supra Part II.A.
255 See supra Part II.B.
256 See UNFAIR LIABILITY, supra note 3, at 2.
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railroads; more importantly, these policies would only serve to shift the
risks of hazmat transportation to other municipalities.257
Modifying or abolishing the common carrier obligation altogether
carries its own set of likely, detrimental consequences.258 These include
shifting hazmats to other, less safe modes of transportation and giving
railroads de facto control over chemical markets.
Imposing a statutory cap on damages caused by a hazmat release
resulting from a railroad accident suffer two major criticisms.259 First,
the variables that determine the scope of the damage of a hazmat release
make it nearly impossible to meaningfully devise a damages cap that
neither leaves an injured plaintiff without just compensation nor subjects
defendant railroads to damages that are unjustifiably high in a given case.
Second, legislative caps on damages have come under fire on constitutional
grounds, and in the medical malpractice context, at least one such dam-
ages cap has been overturned as violating constitutional separation of
powers principles.
Some parties involved with hazmat shipment via rail suggest that
the STB update the URCS model to better account for unique costs asso-
ciated with hazmat shipments, including insurance, increased manpower,
and route congestion.260 Although there appears to be some degree of agree-
ment that the URCS model as a whole is out of date, adjusting it for the
shipment of hazmats still suffers the fatal flaw of being unable to address
the costs of a catastrophic hazmat release.
Finally, the Price-Anderson Act and the liability backstop model it
creates provide the best method of reforming hazmat release liability for
railroads.261 In the nuclear power industry, the Act creates a two-tiered in-
surance system, with primary level coverage coming from licensee-obtained
insurance at the maximum available amount (determined by regulators)
and secondary level coverage coming from all licensees in the form of retro-
spective premiums. In addition to the two-tiered insurance system is a
system of federal claims consolidation and waiver of defenses.
Importing the principles of the Price-Anderson Act into an analo-
gous liability backstop for rail shipment of hazmats produces a system
in which railroads provide primary-level insurance in the amount of $1
billion. Secondary-level coverage in this system would come from all
257 See supra Part III.A.
258 See supra Part III.B.
259 See supra Part III.C.
260 See supra Part III.D.
261 See supra Part III.E.
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seven Class I freight railroads and producers of hazmats who ship by
rail. First, it is important to point out that doing so would only subject
the chemical producers to financial liability in the event of a catastrophic
release exceeding the $1 billion in primary-level coverage, an event that
has yet to occur. Structuring a liability backstop this way can simulta-
neously achieve the purposes of limiting railroads’ overall liability for a
hazmat release and incentivizing both railroad safety improvements (as
the waiver of defenses under this system turns hazmat transportation into
a strict liability activity) and the development of inherently safer chemicals
by the chemical industry, as doing so would reduce the probability of a
catastrophic hazmat release.
